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Comparative Law as Rhetoric: An
Analysis of the Use of Comparative
Law in International Arbitration
Frederic Gilles Sourgens 1
Many of today's largest and most important legal disputes have changed
almost unrecognizably from traditional court litigation: they are resolved by
private arbitral tribunals, apparently apply multiple legal systems to achieve
their final award and, at times, involve a stunning number of languages and
cultures.
Unsurprisingly, international arbitrations are a teeming petri dish for the
practice of comparative law. Nowhere is this practice more active than in
the advocacy to international tribunals. Nevertheless, the use of comparative
law in international arbitral pleading practice has received relatively little
systematic attention. Authors that do tackle the use of comparative law in
arbitration look more to its impact on the arbitral procedural framework, or
how arbitrators themselves use comparative law, rather than to the use of
comparative law in legal argument.2 This leaves an important gap in the
literature. This essay attempts to chart this next frontier of dispute resolution
scholarship.
The bulk of the comparative work of an arbitration counsel will go
towards finding effective means of persuading a tribunal.3 It is part of his
1. Associate, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP, Washington D.C.; J.D., Tulane
University Law School; M.A., Political Philosophy, University of York (U.K); candidatus
magisterii, Latin and Philosophy, University of Oslo (Norway). The views expressed in this article
are solely my own and not those of my firm or its clients.
2. See, e.g., Judd Epstein, The Use of Comparative Law in Commercial International
Arbitration and Commercial Mediation, 75 TUL. L. REV. 913 (2001) (discussing how comparative
law helps to "design a procedural regime for the individual arbitration); see generally JULIAN D. M.
LEY, LOUKAs A. MISTELIS & STEFAN M. KROLL, COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION (2003) (discussing in a comparative manner how arbitration is conducted through the
key stages of an arbitration); ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK CONVENTION OF 1958
(1981) (discussing the practice of courts in enforcing arbitral awards).
3. The term "comparative law" is not used as a means to establish the applicable law to a
dispute. It assumes that an applicable law has already been chosen by the underlying contract or
arbitration agreement.
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advocacy tool kit. 4 Typically, there are three distinct ways in which counsel
would then deploy these tools in practice: (1) he could use comparative law
to explain law foreign to the tribunal in a manner helpful to his case, (2) he
could use it as a means to close legal gaps in the law applicable to the
dispute, and (3) he could use it to extract general principles of international
law or trade usages. This essay deals with the first of these questions. In
brief, it focuses on comparative legal rhetoric in arbitration. It leaves for
later discussion the more traditional substantive roles of comparative law in
the context of international arbitration.
Before exploring in more detail the use of comparative law in arbitral
rhetoric, two rather obvious questions must be addressed: what does
"comparative law" mean, and what is "rhetoric?" Once armed with an
understanding of these two definitions, this essay can delve into its analysis
of comparative law as a rhetorical tool in international arbitration.
I. COMPARATIVE LAW
While the term comparative law is often used in legal discourse, its
meaning is far from clear. "Comparative law" does not in and of itself
identify a concrete discipline or method. It does not even attempt to provide
an answer to a common problem. Rather, the term is used loosely to capture
a growing number of scholars that engage in the comparison of legal
systems, or their relevant disciplines to satisfy their varied intellectual
curiosities.5 Thus, the task of discerning what comparative law is, let alone
what "good" comparative law scholars ought to do, may well be impossible
to achieve.
In order to understand how arbitral rhetoric interplays with comparative
law, one must look to the established usages of comparative law. There are
three main functions of comparative law: The first function of comparative
law has always been the deeper, "academic" understanding of the law.6
Second, comparative law has served to improve legislative projects.7 As the
purely "scientific" use of comparative law may well come to conclusions
regarding deficits in the law-or how to mend them-both the scientific and
4. For lack of a neutral pronoun, the term "he" is used generically to encompass both men
and women throughout this essay.
5. For a discussion on the dominant schools of comparative law, see Konstantinos D.
Kerameus, Comparative Law and Comparative Lawyers: Opening Remarks, 75 TUL. L. REV. 865,
866-70 (2001).
6. See David S. Clark, Nothing New in 2000? Comparative Law in 1900 and Today, 75 TUL.
L. REV. 871, 875-76 (2001).
7. See, e.g., Ole Lando, Comparative Law and Lawmaking, 75 TuL. L. REV. 1015 (2001).
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legislative models of comparative law have been closely allied in the past.8
Finally, comparative law has recently been used to address transactional
concerns in the negotiation of contracts. 9 Here, comparative law is often
closely related to concerns of choice of law, or private international law as it
is known in civilian jurisdictions.'o
A. Comparative law as a scientific tool
Comparative law has an undeniable academic pedigree. The basic
approach of scientific comparative law is rather intuitive. Simply stated it is
somewhat reminiscent of Russian puppets, placing specific questions in the
context of ever larger contexts. Thus, the first question of legal comparison
generally concerns a specific topic-say the area of legal procedure. This
question is analyzed first in terms of its basic legal principles." Next, the
comparativist looks to the application in the respective court systems. 12 The
respective interplays between these legal rules in application are then
examined in light of their place in the legal system in general. " Finally, the
legal systems themselves are put in the perspective of their own historical,
political, and cultural environments. 14
Scholars have put this method to a great variety of uses and refined it to
meet their respective needs. Thus, some have focused on learning from
foreign systems for the purpose of unifying the underlying legal systems to
one another. 15  These scholars tend to take a functional perspective.
16
8. See Clark, supra note 6, at 876. To the same end, academics often encourage judges to
look at comparative law from this vantage point once a particular lacuna or other weakness in
existing jurisprudence has been discovered. See id.; see also SIR BASIL MARKESINIS, COMPARATIVE
LAW IN THE COURTROOM AND CLASSROOM, 157-82 (2003).
9. See, e.g., Judd Epstein, The Use of Comparative Law in Commercial International
Arbitration and Mediation, 75 TUL. L. REV. 913, 918-23 (2001).
10. See, e.g., H. Patrick Glenn, Comparative Law and Legal Practice: On Removing the
Borders, 75 TUL. L. REV. 977, 998-99 (2001).
11. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 2, at 917.
12. See, e.g., Reinhard Zimmermann, The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial
Contracts 2004 in Comparative Perspective, 21 TUL. EUR. & Civ. L.F. 1 (2006).
13. See, e.g., Walter A. Stoffel, Enlightened Decision Making, 75 TUL. L. REV. 1195, 1196
(2001).
14. See id. at 1200; see also James Gordley, Comparative Law and Legal Education, 75 TUL.
L. REV. 1003 (2001); Arthur T. von Mehren, The Rise of Transnational Legal Practice and the Task
of Comparative Law, 75 TUL. L. REV. 1215 (2001).
15. See Stoffel, supra note 13, at 1215. "Unification" is used as a term of art, meaning "the
qualitative comparison of the respective norms, with view towards choosing the best one among
3
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Others will discount a majority of such functional comparisons as
meaningless, because they do not account sufficiently for the deeply rooted
cultural origins of the law.' 7  To these scholars, comparative law merely
helps gain a better understanding of our own legal "taboos;"' 8 it is of only
limited use to improve these deeply irrational cultural responses by means of
simple syllogisms.' 9
The traditional methods of scientific comparative law provide the
methodological starting point for legal comparison. However, because of
their varied scientific purposes, no one of these methods constitutes the be-
all and end-all of comparative law. As will be discussed more fully below,
the main attraction of these scientific methods for the advocate lie in the
stores of argument in favor or against the use of comparative law to reach a
normative conclusion. Thus, if an advocate wants to rely on foreign law as
it is more suited to his position, he may find scientific support for his
position. At the same time, his opponent will also find materials from which
to assemble his defense. Neither, however, will find any help in scientific
comparative law on how to deploy these materials as part of their case.
B. Comparative law as a legislative tool
Beyond its mere scientific use, comparative law also traditionally served
as a legislative tool. 20 The legislative approach to comparative law, much
like the scientific approach, is intuitive. It begins by analyzing a specific
area of law currently under discussion for reform. 2' Foreign legal systems
them and adapting all the others." Konstantinos D. Kerameus, Procedural Harmonization in
Europe, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 401,401 (1995); see also RUDOLF SCHLESINGER, HANS BAADE, MIRJAN
DAMASKA, & PETER HERZOG, COMPARATIVE LAW: CASES, TEXTS AND MATERIALS 31-34 (5th ed.
1988).
16. See, e.g., Lando, supra note 7, at 1020 (part of these steps discussed here have already
been subsumed in Professor Lando's step of "comparative research" undertaken by the reporter);
Zimmermann, supra note 12; see also Kazuaki Sono, The Rise of Anational Contract Law in the Age
of Globalization, 75 TUL. L. REv. 1185 (2001).
17. See Clark, supra note 6, at 885-86; see also Andr6 Weiss, Rdle, Fonction et Mthode du
Droit Compari dans le Domaine du Doit Civil, in 1 CONGRES INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT COMPARE:
PROCtS-VERBAUX DES SEANCES ET DOCUMENT 347-54 (1905).
18. See Clark, supra note 6, at 886.
19. See Adhrmar Eisman, Le Droit Compare et l'Enseignement du Droit, 29 BULL. DE LA
SOCItTt 373, 376-79 (1900) (discussing the potential for limited approximations within legal
families).
20. See generally Lando, supra note 7, at 871, 884, 886; Zimmermann, supra note 12.
21. See generally Lando, supra note 7; Peter Schlechtriem, EC Directives, Common
Principles, and Law Reform, 75 TUL. L. REv. 1177 (2001); Zimmermann, supra note 12.
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are, then, consulted as source material for one's own drafting efforts, 2 or as
arguments to convince fellow lawmakers, or the public at large, of one's side
in the legislative debate.23 As a matter of legislative rhetoric, foreign laws
are used as examples of how a similar position in the domestic debate has
thrived or failed abroad.
The main difference between comparative law as an academic's device
and as a legislative tool lies in its purpose. The academic purpose for
comparative law is to gain a better understanding of the law. The legislator
uses comparative law as a tool to support a political argument. 4
Understanding and jurisprudentially improving the law is only a secondary
concern to the overarching political goal. The legislator uses comparative
law as support for his conviction that the law ought to conform to some
other extra legal concern.25 Thus, the legislator's use of comparative law
may well be close to the use an advocate before a tribunal may make of it: as
a tool of persuasion. This differentiates the academic from the legislative
use of comparative law.
Of course, the legislative use of comparative law is not a clear match for
the arbitral advocate, either. For one, the legislator typically is concerned
with convincing a domestic audience of his political goals. He does not
have to communicate his argument to foreigners. Also, the use of legal
argument is, in itself, a subsidiary concern for the politician. It is the main
driving force in most arbitrations. Thus, while there are interesting
similarities in the use of comparative law by legislators and in arbitral
advocacy, these similarities may well be of limited practical value.
C. Comparative law as a transactional tool
Comparative law has also made inroads into the transactional practice
and its academic analysis.2 6 Importantly, comparative law questions look
largely into the context of choice of law or dispute resolution provisions.
22. See, e.g., PRODUCT LIABILITY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Duncan Fairgrieve ed.,
2005).
23. See, e.g., R.J. Radford, Universal Health Care Can Come With Drawbacks, Letters to the
Editor, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES ONLINE, January 7, 2003, http://www.sptimes.com/
2003/01/07/Opinion/Universal healthcare.shtml (the universal health care debate in the U.S. as
discussed in op-ed letters).
24. See Clark, supra note 6, at 911-12.
25. See id.
26. See Epstein, supra note 2, at 918-23.
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These concerns are generally secondary to the broader commercial concerns
in contractual negotiations. Nevertheless, as businesses become increasingly
aware of their legal choice to frame their bargain, both questions are gaining
prominence.
The transactional approach to comparative law, if one such approach
can be identified, will look first and foremost to the commercial objectives
of the client. Next, potential applicable laws and dispute resolution
provisions will be assessed against this commercial objective. In some
cases, transactional practitioners also encounter an additional comparative
layer when parties from different legal systems have entirely different legal
pre-conceptions of their relationships under a contract. When they become
of aware of these differences comparative law can also act as a translation
device to give comfort to all parties that the bargain to which they agree on
paper is, in fact, the bargain they intended to get. 7
The transactional approach makes interesting advances on the relevant
point of view for the arbitration practitioner. The comparative method no
longer focuses on the underlying jurisdictions in their own right. Rather, it
focuses on communicating and manipulating the normative content of one
legal systems in terms of another. Comparative law serves the same purpose
in international arbitrations, be it in a different manner.
II. RHETORIC
It is almost self-evident that the concern of an advocate, legal or
political, international or domestic, involves rhetoric. Thus, an advocate in
international arbitration uses comparative law as part of his or her legal
rhetoric. If comparative law as an advocacy tool is to be more than an
advanced exercise in smoke and mirrors, the definition of rhetoric must
reflect this broader ambition for itself. This section sets out to find just such
a definition. First, it will discuss the common misconceptions of rhetoric.
Next, it will dispel them by reference to the foundational theories of rhetoric.
Finally, it will confirm that these, sometimes ancient, theories of rhetoric
still describe the best practices in current arbitral advocacy.
A. Misconceptions of Rhetoric
Rhetoric today has negative connotations. 28 These connotations are the
worst in the legal context. Here, popular perception views legal rhetoric as
27. See id. at918-19.
28. See, e.g., Buying Votes, Economist Intelligence Unit Briefing, Oct. 17, 2007,
http://www.economist.com/daily/news/displaystory.cfin?story-id=9976401.
6
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little more than a cheap trick.2 9 This point of view is consistent with the
broader attitude that evidence, be it in science or law, speaks for itself.3°
Rhetoric steps between the evidence and the audience and shapes the
evidence into something other than what it originally was.31 Therefore,
rhetoric is an unnecessary and dangerous distraction to a proper
understanding of the underlying subject.
This outlook on evidence is relatively young. In the sciences, it is
traditionally rooted in the principles of positivism and, though the positivist
perspective itself has largely been rejected, has been incorporated in the
contemporary paradigms of scientific reasoning.3 2 A similar perspective has
also become prevalent in the social sciences, which increasingly argued for
and employed scientific methodologies to understand moral and legal
questions.3
Similar criticisms can be voiced against the use of comparative law as
rhetoric in international arbitrations. As discussed below, this point of view
introduces the concern that the use of comparative law as rhetoric takes the
arbitrator away from making the correct decision and instead encourages
him or her to make a decision on entirely improper grounds. To face this
criticism an altogether different perspective on rhetoric is needed.
B. The Traditional Role of Rhetoric
In order to understand the role of rhetoric in international arbitration, the
art of rhetoric must first be explored in its own right. The basic premise on
29. See, e.g., 'What a Farce,' Simpson Trial Draws Jeers 'Round the World, CNN, Oct. 3,
1993, http://www.cnn.comiUS/OJ/verdict/ world/index.html.
30. See M. Tullius Cicero, Pro Milone, XX.53, available at http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-
bin/ptext?doc=Perseus%3Atext 3A1999.02.001 l&layout=&loc=Mil.+53 (English translation by C.
D. Yonge, available at http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?doc=Perseus:text: 1999.02
.0020:text=Mil.:section=53).
31. See HANS-GEORG GADAMER, WAHRHEIT UND METHODE 1-47 (6th ed. 1990); see also
Anthony T. Kronman, Rhetoric, 67 U. CIN. L. REv. 677, 684-87 (1999).
32. See generally ALEX ROSENBERG, PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE, A CONTEMPORARY
INTRODUCTION (2d ed. 2005).
33. Compare GADAMER, supra note 31, at 12, 29, 38-9, and JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE (1971). That is not to say that ancient philosophy did not have powerful proponents of a
similar world view-to the contrary, Plato, the most pre-eminent ancient philosopher, shared this
point of view. Yet, his perspective was not shared and did not shape Western cultural traditions on
point, which, pace Plato, remained fervently rhetorical until the dawn of modem rationalist
philosophy. On this cultural development, see also QUENTIN SKINNER, REASON AND RHETORIC IN
THE PHILOSOPHY OF HOBBES (1996).
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which rhetoric rests is rather simple: to arrive at the best solution to a
relevant question, normative reasoning requires persuasion beyond the
powers of strict logical argument.3 4 This premise is plausible both in the
context of great tragic choices captured by literature. More mundanely,
most everyday normative decisions are informed to a large part by our
prejudgments of right and wrong. 36 Thus, if people are faced with several
choices and each appears logical enough in their use of the evidence at stake,
they will likely not agonize over which one of them most logically makes
use of the evidence, but which one of them most resembles their notions of
right and wrong.
Building on this premise, rhetoric traditionally insists that these
underlying preconceptions of right and wrong are not altogether arbitrary.37
Rather, they are based on different societal themes that each give expression
to basic intuitive human experiences. 38 These themes, rather than pure
reason, are the means by which we understand, express and act on normative
truths.39 Out of this basic premise, rhetoric continued to create infinitely
complex systems. For the current purposes, however, this basic
understanding of a more positive characterization of the task of rhetoric and
its underlying premise is sufficient.
Rhetoric, thus, has internal standards of good and bad that are not
simply directly proportional to the success one has at achieving the speech's
intended result. It is not purely outcome oriented-thus, a successful
argument can fail the internal standards of rhetoric regardless of how well it
was received. 40 This internal standard of the rhetorical school against which
all arguments are finally judged is whether the arguments were conducive to
establishing some form of truth about social action. In fact, it is only
persuasion because of such a realization that can truly be called rhetoric in
34. See Miles F. Burnyeat, Enthymeme: Aristotle on the Rationality of Rhetoric, in ESSAYS ON
ARISTOTLE'S RHETORIC 88-115 (Amelie 0. Rorty ed., 1996).
35. Thus, it was through oratory rather than logic that decisions of life and death were
portrayed from the beginning of literature on. See, e.g., HOMER, ILIAD, 9.269-9.522,, translated in
HOMER, THE ILIAD 259-66 (Robert Fagles trans. 1998).
36. GADAMER, supra note 31, at 286-95.
37. See, e.g., CICERO, DE INVENTIONE, 1.1-2, translated in MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, DE
INVENTIONE 1-7 (Kessinger Publishings 2004).
38. ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC, 1356a36-1359a26, translated in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE
1330-36 (Richard McKeon ed., 2001); Id. at 85-7.
39. See id.; Cicero, supra note 37; Bumycat, supra note 34, at 88-114; Richard Brooks, The
Emergence of the Hellenic Deliberative Ideal, 30 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 43, 67-8 (2006);
GADAMER, supra note 31; MARTIN HEIDEGGER, WAS HEISST DENKEN? VORLESUNG
WINTERSEMESTER 1951/52 (Reclam, 1992). Indeed, as some might argue, the very existence of
existential normative truths may well depend on them. See Kronman, supra note 31, at 700.
40. See, e.g., CICERO, supra note 37, at 6-7.
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the classical sense.4 ' All other forms of persuasion, successful as they may
be, would fail the fundamental purpose of the craft.
C. Rhetoric and International Arbitration
This lofty excursion into the world of ancient rhetoric may appear
gratuitous at first. Yet, it has brought home an important lesson that
legitimizes this entire enterprise: the use of rhetoric does not attempt to
detract from truth, it seeks to create it. 42 Thus, the use of comparative law as
a rhetorical tool does not cheapen comparative law, nor the advocate
presenting an argument. To the contrary, it opens a different point of view
on both the art of arbitral advocacy and comparative law. For the
comparative lawyer, it opens a new field of inquiry; for the arbitration
advocate, a proper understanding of rhetoric helps to shape both his own
understanding of the case and is instrumental in presenting this case to the
arbitral tribunal.43
In the context of international arbitration, one will find that "rhetoric"
differs in important respects from the notion of an orator presenting a
rousing speech to a large audience, or even the idea of a lawyer presenting
his closing argument to a jury. As discussed below, the distillation of the
dispute, through multiple stages of briefing before the hearing on the merits,
forces the advocate to use rhetoric on a far more conceptual level than one
traditionally pictures it. Thus, it is both, arguably, the furthest from the
practice of rhetoric as one envisions it and the closest to its original purpose
discussed above.
The arbitral process, at first blush, differs greatly from dispute to
dispute. There are at least a handful of arbitration rules and institutions that,
at any time, dominate the global arbitration market.44 Beyond these global
41. On the intuitive problem of this classical position for the contemporary legal audience, see
Kronman, supra note 31, at 680. For his resolution of this intuitive problem in favor of a rhetorical
understanding, see id. at 700.
42. Compare Buryeat, supra note 34, at 88-114, with HEIDEGGER, supra note 39.
43. Due to the confidential nature of arbitration pleadings, the following is based on personal
experience.
44. These institutions include the International Court of Arbitration of the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA), the
International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes(ICSID), the Stockholm Chamber of
Commerce (SCC), and the International Center for Dispute Resolution (ICDR). These chambers are
supplemented on the global stage by ad hoc arbitrations under the non-administered UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules.
9
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players, there is a second layer of national arbitration organizations and
industry-specific dispute practices. 45  Finally, the parties have at their
disposal an arsenal of options to change these default processes by means of
the arbitration clause.4 Thus, the treatment of "rhetoric in international
arbitration" can only touch on the broad common questions that they will
need to take into account when approaching an international dispute as a
advocates. Arbitration is by far too diffuse to allow for any specific answers
to problems arising within each arbitral domain to be forthcoming within the
confines of this essay.47
As compared to litigation, arbitration is arguably a more precise and
reasoned enterprise in several respects: The parties for the most part have a
great influence on the composition of the tribunal that will hear their
dispute.48 They will likely choose experts in the relevant area crucial to the
dispute. The process is, thus, already more sophisticated than a trial tried
before laymen jurors and even more specialized than a bench trial due to the
targeted expertise of the arbitrators in each case. Rhetoric in international
arbitration, therefore, is far more cerebral from the beginning than rhetoric
would be in any other forensic setting.
This nature of the process is further underlined by the fact that
international arbitration has several written stages of argument before the
merits of the case are ever orally discussed before the tribunal. 49  Thus,
arguments are refined over longer periods of time and can be answered and
refuted with the full comfort of weeks before the next round of briefing is
due to the tribunal. It has also become practice in international arbitrations
to provide written witness statements, as well as expert reports, far in
advance of a final hearing on the merits.50 Many tribunals further are
disinclined to give credence to testimony that is unsupported by
45. Such prominent institutions include the Singapore International Arbitration Center (SIAC),
the Chinese International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIAC), the Dubai
International Arbitration Centre, and arbitration under the World Intellectual Property Organization
Rules (WIPO).
46. See, e.g., English Arbitration Act of (1996), §1(b), available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/
acts 1996/ukpga_ 9960023_en_2#ptl-pbl- 1 Igl.
47. See THE ART OF ADVOCACY IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (R. Doak Bishop ed. 2004)
for an excellent survey of the different sets of practices in international arbitration organized by
region.
48. See, e.g., International Chamber of Commerce, Arbitration Rules, Article 8(2), available at
http://www.icewbo.org/court/english/arbitration/rules.asp#article_8.
49. See, e.g-, London Court of International Arbitration, Arbitration Rules: Rules, Clauses &
Costs, Article 15 available at http://www/Icia.org/ARBfolder/arb-english_main.htm#article 15.
50. See Doak Bishop, Toward a Harmonized Approach to Advocacy in International
Arbitration, in THE ART OF ADVOCACY IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 451, 476 (R. Doak Bishop
ed., 2004).
10
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contemporaneous documentary evidence.5' Thus, by the time the final
hearing on the merits rolls around, most of the advocacy has already been
done and is firmly constricted within the confines of binders of documents
and long pages of arguments and prior statements. Consequently, arbitral
counsel will have little chance to dazzle his audience at the merits hearing.
Worse still, even if counsel would succeed at a surprise, opposing counsel
often has post-hearing briefing to diffuse the argument. In sum, Perry
Mason-styled advocacy simply fails to convince in international arbitration
due to a process strongly favoring balanced written advocacy.
52
Rhetoric nevertheless does have a place in international arbitration. As
Doak Bishop, an accomplished arbitral advocate, counsels "[w]hile overt
emotionalism is rarely rewarded in international arbitration, neglecting the
humanity of the arbitrators is even more rarely rewarded., 5 3 The question
thus is where and how the rhetorical tradition would suggest lodging such an
appeal. The most important place in the majority of arbitral disputes is in
the portrayal of the facts of the dispute. As with rhetoric in general, it is
important to organize these facts in light of the compelling theme of the
case. 54  The theme, however, often remains more subtle than in other
disputes, save in investment disputes ("the government marched onto my
property at gun point and demanded the books and the keys" hardly
qualifying as a subtle theme). Its appeal will largely depend on a correct
understanding of the arbitrators' experience and perspective and as this is a
comparative exercise all of its own. Yet, at its core this aspect of arbitral
advocacy is likely so akin to notions of traditional rhetoric that one could
easily adapt Cicero's magnificent De Inventione to the field."5
It is, thus, in the presentation of legal argument that one of the main
cruces for the arbitral advocate lies. In his legal argument, counsel has to
appeal to the arbitrator's notions of right and wrong.5 6 These notions of
right and wrong are far more complex and involved than the emotive
51. See id. at 473; see also Charles N. Brower, Evidence Before International Tribunals, The
Need for Some Standard Rules, 24 INT'L LAW. 47, 62 (1994).
52. Perry Mason, US Legal Drama/Mystery, The Museum of Broadcast Communication,
http://www.museum.tv/archives/etv/P/htmlP/perrymason/perrymason.htm ("As evidence mounts
against his client, Mason pulls out a legal maneuver involving some courtroom 'pyrotechnics.' This
not only proves his client innocent, but identifies the real culprit.").
53. Bishop, supra note 50, at 452.
54. See CICERO, supra note 37, at 85-7.
55. See id. at 85-7.
56. See, e.g., Bishop, supra note 50, at 453.
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response of a domestic jury. It will involve not only the cultural equitable
stereotypes of the place of origin of the arbitrator, it is overlaid with
normative reflexes acquired in countless years of legal training. Thus, the
presenter of the legal argument to an international arbitrator not only has to
worry about the question of whether or not a specific legal position appears
fair to the arbitrator as a human being, but whether it can be made congruent
with the natural legal "prejudgments" the arbitrator brings to the hearing
table.57 Here, the art of arbitral advocacy intersects with the science of
comparative law.
III. THE USE OF LEGAL COMPARISON IN ARBITRAL ARGUMENT
The challenge facing the international arbitral advocate is remarkable.
While the final goal seems rather obvious-i.e. convince the arbitrators-it
requires great effort to achieve it. If we take the rhetorical school at its
word, succeeding at this challenge requires the creation of a new legal world
from the building blocks of the applicable law, held together by the mortar
of comparative law. How should an advocate go about those tasks? As
discussed below, there are three levels on which an advocate can approach
this task: the first couches legal concepts of the applicable laws in a
normative language open to all arbitrators; the second is more direct,
explaining legal concepts by analogy to a foreign law which the arbitrators
are more familiar with; finally, the third uses comparative law to deflect
harmful interpretations of the applicable law. Ordinarily, arbitral advocacy
will involve a little of each of these three tools. For reasons explained
below, the first of these tools, the subtle explanation of the relevant concepts
under the applicable law, remains far and away the most important.
A. The Legal Salad Bowl: Communicating Across Jurisdictional Divides
One of the most common aspects of international arbitration is that the
parties, counsel, the arbitrators, chair, and potentially the applicable law
each are at home in different jurisdictions. 8 Thus, a case involving a
57. See GADAMER, supra note 31, at 286-95.
58. An example of such diversity is hard to find due to the confidential nature of most arbitral
proceedings. The ICSID case of Telenor Mobile Communications A.S. v. Republic of Hungary,
ICSID Case No. Arb 04/15 (2006), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/pdf/
ARB0415_telenor-v-hungary-award.pdf, could nonetheless serve as a good example for the diversity
of parties, counsel and tribunal. Telenor is a Norwegian company claiming against the Hungarian
state. Id. The Norwegian company was represented by Hungarian counsel. Id. The Hungarian state
was represented by the Washington office of Arnold & Porter. Id. The chair of the Tribunal and one
12
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contract dispute between an Egyptian and an Italian party easily may involve
French and English counsel; the Swiss Code of Obligations as applicable
law; a Tribunal comprised of a Swede; a German, and a Canadian chair; a
Dubai seat and a choice among a myriad of arbitration rules. Counsel thus
face the challenge to explain to a tribunal the impact of (a) the applicable
law under which they likely were not trained-here the Swiss Code of
Obligations, (b) the procedural law that they are not directly familiar with,
here the Dubai laws applying to arbitration, and (c) the business culture that
they have likely only been tangentially exposed to, here the business culture
of Italy and Egypt.
The fundamental task of counsel is to transform these divergent rules,
which the arbitrators thus far may have had little or no exposure to, into
something that is inherently familiar to them. Analytically, this task breaks
into three different components: (i) recasting rules which already seem
familiar, (ii) explaining rules that are entirely foreign, and (iii) applying
these legal concepts to an alien business setting.
The first element involves communication within a legal family. In our
example, this exercise would apply most clearly with regard to the Swiss
applicable law and the German arbitrator. It would apply, maybe with less
force, to the Swedish and Canadian arbitrators (depending on which
Canadian province was home to his alma mater). With regard to counsel,
the French avocat would equally appear to have a leg up on his English
counterpart.
While this exercise intuitively appears to be the easiest, it may well be
the most difficult to master. Thus, the French avocat may well be tempted
to rely too much on his own preconceptions of the law of obligations in their
reading of the Swiss Code.5 9 Further, to get to certain helpful parts of the
Code, it may be necessary to disabuse the arbitrators of their legal reflexes,
where a subtle difference in interpretation can win the case.6 ° It is thus a
task of almost having to unlearn and releam the law for both counsel and the
arbitrators. Worse still, for counsel it involves walking the tightrope
between disabusing the arbitrators from some of their preconceived notions
of the law while appealing to these very notions in other parts of his case.
This task can only be achieved fully, if counsel consciously deconstructs the
arbitrator were British with the third arbitrator hailing from the United States. Id. at 3-4. The
applicable law was a treaty between Norway and Hungary. Id. at 3.
59. See Stoffel, supra note 13, at 1196.
60. See id.
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applicable law and reconstructs the law in its totality with these concerns in
mind. It thus resembles a successful translation of a work of literature-
carefully avoiding false friends and words evoking different connotations
while relying, where possible, on linguistic similarities between the language
of origin and the new host language of the work.61
One of the most frequently cited examples in which such a legal
translation problem arises is in the context of force majeure. As an
arbitration practitioner warned in the context of drafting force majeure
clauses:
Frustration is not the equivalent of force majeure or Unm6glichkeit nor is force majeure
Unm6glichkeit; even force majeure under Belgian law is not force majeure under French
law. Although all these concepts belong to the same family, the distinction between them
is extremely important in drafting choice of law clauses in international contracts.
62
After analyzing the different legal regimes in question in the article, the
author concludes with the following hypothetical:
Lawyers like facts: a wine connoisseur signs a contract for the construction under his
house of a very sophisticated wine cellar, air and humidity conditioned. The house is
burned down before execution of the contract, leaving the basement part in perfect
condition.
Under English law, this would certainly be considered frustration; in French law probably
impr~vision e.g.: to be performed, possibly after a delay because the house can be rebuilt.
The question arises whether a German judge will consider that the parties' intention in
this specific contract is clear although not expressed: no wine cellar without a house. Is
this completion of the contract? Or is it simply a normative problem: the very economic
basis of the contract has disappeared and so the contract itself burned away with the
house. What happens if the owner moves to another house of his own with a cellar? Will
the judge adjust the contract and invite the building contractor to build a wine cellar in
the other basement? What if the owner moves to an apartment? Depending on the
answers, the flexible Japanese judge, will rule in accordance with common sense.
In fact all these cases go back to a basic error made at the moment of signing a contract.
Due to changing circumstances, this error subsequently makes it very hard for one of the
parties to perform the contract. The risk involved in contracting should not be such that it
covers also totally unforeseeable and dramatic changes in the contractual environment.
To what extent those changes have to be identified or simply mentioned in the contract, is
recognized differently in every country. Knowledge of this is rather important for
61. See GEORGE STEINER, AFTER BABEL: ASPECTS OF LANGUAGE AND TRANSLATION 1-51
(3d ed. 1998).
62. A. H. Puelinckx, Frustration, Hardship, Force Majeure, Imprvision, Weg/all der
Geschdfisgrundlage, Unm6glichkeit, Changed Circumstances: A Comparative Study in English,
French, German and Japanese Law, 3 J. INT'L ARB. 47, 47 (1986).
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lawyers practicing international law, if they want to avoid frustration and hardship for
their client and for themselves.
63
The arbitration practitioner is faced with the problem described in the
hypothetical, the underlying force majeure clause is already set, in all
likelihood its application to the case at hand is unclear. Mr. Puelinckx does
not, however, leave the arbitration practitioner having to explain a French
clause to a German arbitrator without recourse. He focuses the practitioner's
attention on the common factual concern behind the different rules of law on
point. A careful use of this factual matrix may be the most efficient means
for the arbitration practitioner to translate the relevant question of law. It
constructs the applicable legal norms (or value judgments) through their
relation to archetypal fact patterns. Such a fact driven construction of the
relevant legal rules is likely the best means of approaching the task of
explaining normative differences in related legal systems in an arbitration. It
is true to the underlying law. It keeps intact the legal intuitions of the
audience. Yet, rather than allowing these intuitions to run astray, they are
harnessed by counsel through a careful factual redefinition of the key legal
terms in dispute.64
The task of explaining an entirely foreign legal system to the arbitrators
is based on the same principle of translation of legal concepts. It thus
mirrors the work that has to be done to explain legal concepts within a legal
family. It also differs in important regards. Practically, it may well be easier
to have arbitrators cast aside some preconceptions that are in the way of a
helpful argument in an entirely foreign context. Theoretically, however, it
will be far more difficult to rebuild a legal universe from the foreign law that
will appear familiar to the arbitrators, as the applicable law is not related in
the same way to their own legal background.
How counsel can rebuild the legal universe will, of course, vary from
case to case. The shorthand in many instances will be the use of familiar
legal terms for related legal concepts. Counsel may use this familiar term
and "re-define" it in his advocacy.65 Of course, this will certainly be of little
persuasive help if the difference between both legal systems on this point
63. See id. at 64-5.
64. On force majeure in French law, see FRANQOIs TERRF-, PHILIPPE SIMLER, YVES
LEQUETTE, DROIT CIVIL: LES OBLIGATIONS 568-73 (9th ed. 2005). Cf STEPHAN LORENZ, THOMAS
RICHON, LEHRBUCH ZUM NEUEN, SCHULDRECHT 146-75 (2002).
65. The power of words in shaping our perceptions has been best described in drama. See
JOHANN WOLFGANG GOETHE, FAUST 1, NACHT, translated in JOHANN WOLFANG GOETHE, FAUST
93-124 (W. Kaufmann trans., 1961); see also BRIAN FRIEL, TRANSLATIONS: A PLAY (1981).
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supports the argument better. In such a case, it may well be useful to
transliterate the original term with a definition so as to set a visual reminder
of the difference.66 Between both extremes, counsel will create a normative
language that will make the applicable law accessible to the arbitrators and
through the use of the language will make the arbitrators feel at ease in their
new normative environs. Of course, counsel will not do well to venture
down this path alone, but will recruit the help of foreign law experts, and
many trained comparativists, to assist in this exercise.67
Before moving to the final application of the legal language, one further
"snag" must be noted. It is not atypical that a tribunal would have at least
one member from the jurisdiction of the applicable law. In those cases,
counsel must take care that the language used is not only accessible to the
arbitrators that are foreign to the applicable law, but also that counsel's use
of language remains plausible within the context of the original normative
discourse. Thus counsel must take care not to oversimplify or uproot legal
concepts beyond reason. In a word, such an exercise is likely the most
complex because it requires our original author and our foreign reader to be
equally satisfied with our endeavors of legal translation. 68
As discussed above, successful legal translation in the context of
arbitration is driven by a careful treatment of the facts of the case.
Problematically, the facts themselves may be alien to the arbitrators, thus
requiring counsel to explain a foreign law by reference to facts that
themselves will be familiar to the panel. Although the lessons from
comparative law for the explanation of facts in international arbitration is a
matter for a different time, the application of the normative language is
unavoidably a question for our current enterprise. Again, the skill lies in
capturing key events in terms of the new normative language in such a
manner that they make intuitive sense. Problematically, what seemed a
feasible translation in theory may fall apart once these alien facts are
properly excavated. The context in which a redefined term is used may then
be so foreign to its original meaning that even borrowing the term would be
senseless and create more confusion than it would resolve.6 9 In those cases,
the application of the law may well force the advocate back to the drawing
66. See Rodolfo Sacco, One Hundred Years of Comparative Law, 75 TUL. L. REV. 1159,
1172-73 (2001).
67. See Bishop, supra note 50, at 453.
68. There is very little literature indeed on this exercise in conceptual translation in the legal
world. See, e.g., Sacco, supra note 66, at 1170-74. An interesting parallel could be drawn here to
the disciplines of linguistics and comparative literature. See generally STEINER, supra note 61.
69. The use of "common law" to refer to "customary law" may be one such radical example.
The use may at times be justified but would likely be entirely out of place if used to explain law
developed through customary practice by bodies other than the courts to a U.S. arbitrator.
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board entirely. Yet, at times, it may be possible to work in epicycles to
explain the legal differences, especially in the context of wholly foreign
legal systems.70 Whether this will be successful depends largely on the
individual circumstances of each case.
Mr. Puelinckx's force majeure example quoted in full above is again
instructive. Explaining the German law of Wegfall der Geschdfisgrundlage7
to an English arbitral panel may be beneficial by re-defining the more
commonly used terms "hardship" or "frustration." If the underlying facts
leading to the event allegedly constituting Wegfall der Geschiftsgrundlage
are foreign the translation of the term to "frustration" or "hardship" may
become overly strained to be convincing.
This may occur if there is a temporary regulatory failure in the
formation of a business enterprise through which the performance of the
contract was contemplated due to a change in law, or due to a change in the
capitalization requirements of the company. Depending on the underlying
obligation imposed by the contract, it may still be possible for the contract to
be performed, but performance may have a legally significant different risk
profile for one of the parties than what was originally anticipated.
Depending on how such facts play out in a dispute, there may be a situation
in which a theory of Wegfall der Geschdfisgrundlage would be arguable or
even plausible and a frustration theory would be counterintuitive.72 If that
were the case, the exercise of unpacking the operative facts of the case could
make it impossible for an arbitral advocate to present such a plausible legal
theory to an English panel; in such a scenario, the operative factual
70. The use of "discovery" to refer to civil law document disclosures may be one such use.
While a U.S. arbitrator would have a very different expectation from a "discovery process" than
what actually took place, it may be possible to explain these differences away without loosing the
value of a familiar marker to the arbitrator.
71. Mr. Puelinckx briefly discusses this concept in his article:
According to this latter doctrine, any contract has a basic aim and emanates from a basic
intention of the parties which cannot be achieved or realized in the absence of an existing
environment, for example, the prevailing economic and social order, the value of the
currency, normal political conditions etc. This definition of the Geschaftsgrundlage
sounds very much like the rebus sic stantibus doctrine in international public law treaties.
German legal scholars agree that commenting on this doctrine is like skating over one
night's ice.
Puelinckx, supra note 62, at 59.
72. German law under such circumstances recognizes a theory of Wegfall der
Geschdftsgrundlage on a highly factual test. Generally, an increase of costs by sixty percent is
sufficient to trigger it. Further, a mistake by both parties concerning a tacitly assumed legal
framework has also been found to satisfy it. See generally LORENZ ET AL., supra note 64, at 204-06.
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assumptions of English law frustration would diverge too much from the
German applicable law for such a legal translation to make sense. The facts
of the case may require a stretch of the factual assumptions of the law
beyond plausibility. In such cases, different tools of legal translation may
well be called for. One candidate to communicate the law correctly may be
scientific comparative law that breaks down and explains in detail why the
core factual assumptions of the laws concerned differ, so as to fully educate
the panel on the relevant legal differences.73
As becomes clear from this introduction to the art of using legal
comparison to create a common normative language for the dispute, it is an
inherently case-driven exercise. The advocate's rhetorical acumen will be
tested differently each time. However, as a methodological constant,
comparative law is a valuable translation tool, working in the background of
the pleadings and arguments made to the tribunal. It becomes one of the
main drivers behind the choice of possible themes. It is also the determinant
of diction in the key passages of legal argument. In sum, "comparative
lawyering" is the conditio sine qua non of "good lawyering" in most
international arbitrations.
B. Explaining Foreign Law Concepts through Legal Analogies
Not all applications of comparative law in arbitral advocacy are as
exhaustive and all-encompassing as the task of conceptual translation. One
such typical use is a direct analogy of foreign law to the applicable law.
7 4
Direct analogies are used less frequently but are certainly common in
practice.75 Those analogies can be dangerous as they would be potentially
subject to scrutiny by opposing counsel's expert. Thus, they should
generally only be used if they are close to watertight. If employed sparsely,
analogies are a powerful tool to create further comfort for the arbitrators.
Analogies can be valuable if the law chosen by the parties has not been
previously applied to a similar situation or if the law on point is still
relatively unsophisticated.
If analogies are used as a further tool to create a normative language
with which the arbitrators are comfortable, their use in a specific case may
73. As many arbitrators have extensive experience in foreign laws and comparative law
techniques, this may be as simple as a reminder of the elements of the underlying legal theory and a
caveat that the particular theory is indigenous to the applicable law.
74. See GADAMER, supra note 31, at 76-87.
75. See, e.g., Final Award in case no. 5759 of 1989, in COLLECTION OF ICC ARBITRAL
AWARDS 1991-1995 175, 181 (Jean-Jacques Arnaldez, Yves Derains, Dominique Hascher eds.,
1997); Final Award in case no. 5548 of 1988, in COLLECTION OF ICC ARBITRAL AWARDS 1991-
1995, supra, at 32 (1997).
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also help to place an entire area of law in an appearance of familiarity. As a
caveat, one must again note that as powerful a tool as it can be when
important similarities exist, the worse it can backfire is if there are apparent
inconsistencies. An analogy should, therefore, only be used in this context
when a wider comparison is at least defensible and is compatible with the
normative language at large.
The use of analogies is, thus, a target-specific tool. It can be employed
by itself or in the context of a broader conceptual strategy. In both cases, the
use of the analogy is meant to bridge a gap of understanding between the
arbitrators and an aspect of the case. As with most aspects of advocacy
however, the gap may also widen further if the analogy is ill-formed. This is
a key reason for the sparse use of analogies in many arbitrations.
C. Deflecting Harmful Interpretations through Legal Comparisons
The uses of comparative law in arbitration discussed above have in
common that they positively build a case for the arbitrators. Using those
tools aims at convincing the arbitrators that one is right. As a flipside to
these techniques, comparative law can also be used defensively as a block to
harmful arguments presented by opposing counsel. This use of comparative
law has two main components: (i) countering comparative law arguments
made by opposing counsel and (ii) discrediting interpretations of the
applicable law that do not openly draw on legal comparison suggested by
opposing counsel.
As cautioned earlier, arbitration is a highly sophisticated adversarial
proceeding. Any use of comparative law, whichever form it may take, is,
thus, subject to rebuttal. This rebuttal will focus on the differences between
the proposed interpretation and the "true" meaning of the applicable law.
There are different degrees of "legal segregation" available to refute the
comparative law point made by opposing counsel. Thus, at the extreme one
could rely on the techniques used by comparative law scholars that see each
legal system as a specific answer to problems immanent only within the
legal culture of the applicable law. At the other extreme one could simply
attack a point as an ill-founded comparison in this specific instance leaving
the door open for other, better-formed comparisons.
Advocates also use comparative law to discredit other interpretations of
law suggested by opposing counsel. For example, one could use
comparative law tools as a cautionary excursus: a foreign jurisdiction
interpreted a similar law in the way that opposing counsel suggests; this
interpretation led to severe legal problems down the road. It is also a helpful
19
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tool to discredit attempts by opposing counsel to create an overly optimistic
normative language for a case. For example, one can use it as an illustration
that the legal argument presented by opposing counsel is too much indebted
to authorities that do not form part of the applicable law at all.
Both of these "defensive" uses of comparative law are an important
reality check against the abuses of comparative law in arbitration that can
doubtlessly arise in rare instances. When the value of rhetoric as a means to
discovering normative truths was first discussed, it was juxtaposed to the
view that rhetoric was little more than an arsenal of cheap tricks to confuse
an audience. Our discussion of the uses of comparative law in arbitral
advocacy may have come close to evoking this same criticism again. After
all, what is to stop arbitral counsel from creating a normative language that
is so divorced from the realities of the applicable law chosen by the parties
as to make their choice meaningless?
The practical answer to this question lies in the defensive uses of
comparative law and in the experience and intellect of international
arbitrators. Opposing counsel will likely test both the arguments as well as
the arguments' underlying tenor with great care and present cogent and
convincing counter arguments. Further, international arbitrators often are
accomplished comparative jurists themselves and should in many instances
be aware of foul play without the help of counsel.
These practical limitations, therefore, impose the ideal of rhetoric as an
hermeneutical tool on the international arbitral advocacy on their own
accord. Counsel, as a general rule, will only employ comparative law
successfully if their arguments generate a valid understanding of the rules of
law in play. In doing so, counsel enrich the legal culture of the host law
with the many realizations and experiences of all the other normative
systems drawn upon to create a convincing discourse. While these
enrichments are not permanent-arbitral awards are mostly meant for the
parties and not for wider consumption-they help further develop the facilities
of legal professionals and academics alike to enter into discussions with one
another about their respective conditions juridiques. This broader benefit in
and of itself should dispel the notion that the use of comparative law in
arbitral advocacy should be considered with suspicion, as an attempt at a
self-serving muddying of the applicable legal rules.
IV. PRACTICAL LESSONS FOR TRADITIONAL COMPARATIVE LAW:
COMPARISON AS RHETORIC
This analysis of comparative law in international arbitration has taken
this essay full circle. It began with an analysis of comparative law in its own
right. It concluded, in the last section, that one of the inherent purposes of
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comparative law, that it had previously identified, was well served by
international advocacy. This purpose was the facilitation of communication
between legal cultures and their occasional cross-pollination.76 Thus, we
have finally arrived at the final question of our enquiry: can the practice of
comparative law in international arbitral advocacy further the study of
comparative law? Or, differently put, can arbitral rhetoric cash in on
Professor Glenn's promise of the "next advance" in comparative law?
The answer to this question appears to be a resounding yes. First and
foremost, the practice of comparative law has served, in a scientific sense, as
a means of validation of many of the methods suggested by comparative
lawyers.17 The scientific mantra has been and remains that any hypothesis
must be capable of empirical refutation.7 ' By using comparative law in
arbitral advocacy, many of the hypotheses of comparative law about the
breadth of similarities between legal systems and areas of law have of
necessity been tested and continue to be tested every day. While it is only a
tentative conclusion, international arbitration confirms that legal systems do
share points of contact, many even share common questions and common
approaches to solutions, while also confirming that legal systems are not in
or moving towards a Hegelian end state of harmonization by any stretch of
the imagination. The approach of international legal rhetoric has, thus,
confirmed that a moderate position between the extremes of the comparative
law camps has empirical merit.
79
Arbitral rhetoric can, however, do much more for comparative law than
act as a test case. Importantly, the model of comparison from rhetoric can
serve as a launching pad for further research into comparative law. While
many of these aspects are yet in their raw state, needing further scientific
exploration, there are two aspects from the practice of comparative law in
international arbitration that stand out as significant. The first of these
advances lies in the manner in which comparative law can be used to shape a
normative discourse through shaping the very language in which it is
understood. Second, as a consequence, arbitration advocacy has already
76. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
77. It is indeed ironic that the rhetorical school could, thus, serve the ancillary purpose of
scientific verification in this context. As was discussed previously, it was exactly the criticism
leveled against rhetoric by the scientific schools that it is not subject to scientific verification.
78. See generally KARL POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY (2002).
79. See, e.g., Jan Paulsson, La lex Mercatoria dans L'arbitrage CCI, REVUE DE
L'ARBITRAGE 55-100 (1990) (discussing the growth of the lex mercatoria through comparative law
methods in ICC arbitrations).
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served to broaden the realm of acceptable legal comparisons. It has, thus,
opened a debate that may help drive one of the most important questions of
comparative law for the next century: where does comparison cease to
remain meaningful?
As this essay has shown, the rhetorical school was founded around the
principle that the understanding of normative truths cannot be achieved by
use of pure reason alone. It required a connection to our own independent
understanding of right and wrong to become meaningful. This core function
of rhetoric has come to full use in arbitral advocacy and its employment of
comparative law. Arbitral rhetoric at its best attempts to create a conceptual
normative language in which the dispute is couched. This language seeks to
explore legal realities in a foreign legal system in a way that it can be
understood by an outsider. It seeks to expand the normative pre-conceptions
of the audience to encompass the new legal system. In doing so, it alters the
arbitrators' deep prejudgments on proper legal discourse, as well as those of
counsel. Thus comparative law as rhetoric is a creative exercise that may
best be described as creative normative translation.
Translation of course was one of the early starting points of comparative
law itself.8 ° Therefore, the translation of key foreign codes was one of the
key functions of comparative law societies in the late 1800s and early
1900s. 81 Arguably, it is out of this translation exercise that the drive towards
harmonization first developed. The rhetorical enterprise is taking this
translation a step further than even the harmonization of law. It not only
translates the law passively in its own context, it actively reshapes the law
within the context of the tribunal and the parties to the case. The difference
is marked: rather than harmonizing the underlying laws, counsel harmonizes
the "proto-legal" prejudices on which legal judgment itself is based. In
philosophical terms, rather than comparing individualized objects, rhetoric
subtly changes how the individualization itself occurs. 82
Such an active use of comparative law may well be considered a heresy
by some comparative law scholars. After all, the object of the exercise is not
to uncover some truth inherent in the foreign legal system, but literally to
create a normative truth of one's own that draws on the normative building
blocks of such a legal system. Such scholars could say it is not a faithful
translation, but a purposive adaptation of the law.
This criticism overlooks the value of a creative discourse as opposed to
a passive one. Rhetoric as a creative, active tool helps to shape legal
80. See Clark, supra note 6, at 879.
81. See id.
82. See generally PETER F. STRAWSON, INDIVIDUALS (1959); GILLES DELEUZE, DIFFERENCE
AND REPETITION (1968).
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discourse in a new light.83 The question is no longer "did my theoretical
enquiry into this foreign law result in some academically valuable insight?"
The question becomes "how can I put the foreign law to action?" It is
through the action that insights into the law, almost as a side product, come
clearly into focus. In terms of literary translation, we become aware of a
different truth about a work because we are forced to rewrite this work for a
different audience. In terms of the overarching goals of the comparative
enterprise to facilitate communication between legal systems, it brings
comparative law back from the depths of a dead language to a live and
fruitful discourse.
Of course, this aspect of comparative law as well as the use of foreign
law as an analogy drive the question of how far we can meaningfully take
legal comparison. Counsel may well, at times, pronounce as universally true
what truly is legal gibberish upon closer inspection. Where is the line
drawn? The answer to this question lies in the question itself. It is a
tautology that comparative law can be meaningfully stretched, so long as it
can harbor normative meaning. What this tautology entails is that the limits
of comparative law will be tested through its use in arbitral rhetoric.
Through the crucible of empirical testing, international arbitration, hand-in-
hand with other aspects of the legal profession, will help shape the contours
of comparative law. It will certainly push the outer boundaries of
comparative law further than many scholars' comfort zones.
It will not do so by comparing the unique; rather, it will take
comparative law in a different direction altogether by choosing an active,
creative point of view. As discussed, this active point of view differs from
most other perspectives on comparative law due to its heavy debt to rhetoric
and its unique audience of international lawyers who expect a presentation
that will reduce a complex web of applicable laws to a simple, intuitive
question of right and wrong. As such, the practice of advocacy in
international arbitration will be one of the agents of progress hailed by
Professor Glenn-though progress may at times look different from what we
all had imagined it to be.84
83. See HEIDEGGER, supra note 39.
84. See Glenn, supra note 10, at 1002.
23
Sourgens: Comparative Law as Rhetoric: An Analysis of the Use of Comparativ
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2007
24
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol8/iss1/1
